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Illinois Brick and the
Deterrence of Antitrust Violations-

An Economic Analysist
By GREGORY J. WERDEN*
and MARius

SCHWARTZ**

A successful price-fixing arrangement among a group of competing manufacturers, afper se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,'
increases the price of their product to whomever purchases it. Frequently, the "direct purchasers ' 2 of the price-fixed product will be distributors or other manufacturers, and the price fix causes the prices of
their products to rise as well, a phenomenon commonly referred to as
"passing-on."' 3 This process is repeated again and again as "indirect
purchasers' 4 sell their products to the next link in the vertical supply
chain. Ultimately, much of the effect of the price fix is borne by the
consumers of various final goods in the form of higher prices. The remainder of the effect of the price fix is divided among the various direct
and indirect purchasers of the price-fixed product throughout the verti-

cal supply chain. The question arises: which of the many affected parties should have the right to recover treble damages under section 4 of
t The views expressed herein are not purported to represent those of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
* Senior Economist, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. B.A., 1973,
M.A., 1974, University of Cincinnati; M.A., 1976, Ph.D., 1977, University of Wisconsin.
** Assistant Professor of Economics, Georgetown University. B.Sc., 1976, London
School of Economics; M.A., 1978, Ph.D., 1982, University of California at Los Angeles.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See United States v. Socony-vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
2. The term "direct purchaser" as used in this Article means any party who purchases
the product in question directly from the party suspected of the antitrust violation.
3. See, e.g., McGuire, The Passing-OnDefense and the Right of Remote Purchasersto
Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PrrT. L. REv. 177 (1971); Schaefer,
Passing-OnTheory in Antitrust Treble DamageActions: An Economic andLegalAna sis, 16
WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 883 (1975).

4. The term "indirect purchaser" as used in this Article means any party that
purchases a product from any party in the vertical supply chain other than the party suspected of the antitrust violation, i e., from a direct purchaser or another indirect purchaserwith the ultimate consumer being the last indirect purchaser.
[629]
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the Clayton Act 5 for this effect of the price fix?
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,6 the Supreme Court held that, except in special circumstances, 7 only direct purchasers may recover damages for this effect of price fixing. 8 The Court based this holding on its
conclusion that "the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by
concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge [caused by price fixing] in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could
show was absorbed by it." 9 The wisdom of the Court's decision was
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
6. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
7. See infra note 9.
8. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735. Illinois Brick is limited in that it restricts only the
ability to recover money damages under the federal antitrust laws. Indirect purchasers may
still obtain injunctions under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). See, e.g., In re
Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1167 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905
(1980); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 589-94 (3d Cir.
1979). Indirect purchasers also may still be able to recover money damages under state
antitrust laws. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1975); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a)
(West Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4509 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-14(c)
(Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd 1981); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7521-9 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3(A) (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 133.18(1) (West
Supp. 1984). The antitrust statutes of many other states may be interpreted to allow recovery by indirect purchasers. See Note, IndirectPurchaserSuits Under State Antitrust Laws. A
DetourAround the Illinois Brick Wall, 34 STAN. L. REv. 203, 206 n.21 (1981). It is possible,
however, that such statutes will be held to be preempted because they conffict with federal
law. See generally id. at 211-18; Note, Indirect State PurchaserStatutes: The Preemptive
Power of Illinois Brick, 62 B.U.L. REv. 1241 (1982).
9. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 734-35. In an earlier case that prohibited the use of the
"passing-on defense" and established the right of direct purchasers to recover damages, the
Court had indicated that there might be situations in which exceptions should be made to
that rule. As an example, the Court cited the situation in which the "buyer has a pre-existing
'cost-plus' contract." Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 494, 494
(1968). See infra text accompanying notes 23-31. The IllinoisBrick Court concluded that it
must either overrule Hanover Shoe or preclude indirect purchasers from attempting to recover damages based on the passing-on theory. 431 U.S. at 736. The Court did not elaborate further on the "cost-plus contract" exception, and the lower courts are split on the
exception's breadth. CompareInre Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163-64 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980) (exception applies even if the arrangement was
not a pre-existing cost-plus contract if it was the "functional equivalent"), with Mid-West
Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 577 (3d Cir. 1979) (pre-existing
cost-plus contracts in themselves are not sufficient for the exception to apply; they must also
be of fixed quantity and "must exist between all parties in the distribution chain,. . . so that
the plaintiff has absorbed the illegal overcharge in its entirety"). See also Note, Recovery by
Indirect Purchasersand the Functions of 4ntitrust Treble Damages, 55 Tnx. L. Rav. 1445,
1454-57 (1978). The Illinois Brick Court also indicated that an exception might properly be
made if "the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer." 431 U.S. at 736 n. 16.
This language has been interpreted as allowing indirect purchasers to recover damages in
cases in which the relevant direct purchaser was owned or controlled by its supplier, an
alleged price fixer. See In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1978).
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questioned at the time by the three dissenting Justices,' 0 has been hotly
debated in the scholarly literature," and currently is being reconsid2
ered by Congress.'
This Article focuses on one of the most important issues raised in
this debate-whether, as the Court appears to have concluded, assigning the exclusive right to recover damages to direct purchasers enhances the deterrent effect of private antitrust enforcement. Although
the Illinois Brick rule applies to all damages actions under section 4 of
the Clayton Act, only price fixing is considered in this Article.' 3 The
Article first reviews the Court's rationale in Illinois Brick and summarizes the basic issues in the controversy caused by that decision. An
economic model of private antitrust enforcement is then developed and
the model's implications are compared with the rule of Illinois Brick.
We conclude that the rule limiting recovery to direct purchasers is
probably appropriate. Finally, some observations derived from this
analysis on possible exceptions to the rule and on the optimal legal
system are offered.
The Illinois Brick Debate
The Rationale of Illinois Brick
To understand the rationale of Illinois Brick, it is useful to begin
with the statutory provision for treble damages awards and its historical interpretation in price-fixing cases. Section 4 of the Clayton Act
provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue therefor
• . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."' 4 This provision
raises two distinct but related questions-whether a plaintiff has suffered injury and therefore is entitled to recover and, if so, how much
should be awarded.
10. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 748 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., commentary cited infra notes 33, 42-43, 46.
12. See infra notes 103-05 & accompanying text.
13. The discussion below applies to any concealed violations of the antitrust laws, but
price fixing, including bid rigging and related offenses, is the only important violation of that
type. In addition, we intentionally focus on a violation that clearly should be deterred.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), provided
only for the recovery of treble damages arising from violations of the Act's provisions. The
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), repealed that provision and enacted one virtually identical to it that provided for recovery of treble damages arising from violations of all
"the antitrust laws."
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From the first treble-damages actions for price fixing under the
Sherman Act, the amount of damages to be trebled has been calculated

primarily by multiplying the quantity of the price-fixed product
purchased by the plaintiff, or plaintiffs, by the "estimated difference

between the just and fair market price of the goods and the price actually paid." 15 The latter figure is sometimes referred to as the "overcharge" caused by the price fix, and that is what the Supreme Court
16
was referring to in the above-quoted passage from Illinois Brick. The
amount of damages in price-fixing cases, therefore, is not measured

either by the profits lost by firms that use the price-fixed product as an
input to their production process or by the "welfare loss" 17 borne by

8
consumers of the final product due to the noncompetitive pricing.'
The courts' approach to the other question raised by section 4whether the plaintiff has suffered injury-is more complicated, particu-

larly in cases involving a product that is not sold to ultimate consumers.
In keeping with their method of measuring damages, the courts frequently have held that alleged injuries from antitrust violations, although possibly quite real, were "too remote" to permit the recovery of
damages. Thus, in an early case, the stockholders of a corporation
driven into bankruptcy allegedly by acts that violated the Sherman Act
were not permitted to recover damages.1 9 Similarly, ultimate consumers, a specific category of indirect purchasers, have been precluded
from recovering damages for injuries suffered as a result of the passingon the effect of a price fix that occured upstream in the vertical supply
chain. 20 On the other hand, although direct purchasers necessarily pay
15. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co., 101 F. 900, 901 (C.C.E.D.
Tenn. 1900), aft'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). The damages in this case stemmed from the agreement held illegal in the landmark case of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211 (1899). See also Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Grate Ass'n, 106 F. 38, 47-48 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1900), af'dsub nom. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904) (measure of damages is the difference between the price paid and the market value).
16. See supra text accompanying note 9.
17. For a standard textbook discussion of the "welfare loss" from monopolistic pricing,
see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 14-21

(2d ed. 1980).
18. This is not to say that damages should be measured any differently. Measuring
welfare loss with any degree of accuracy is impossible, so there would be little or nothing to
be gained by doing so.
19. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). Loeb actually antedates § 4
of the Clayton Act and was brought under old § 7 of the Sherman Act. See supra note 14.
The Loeb case, however, is acknowledged as the seminal case in the "antitrust standing
doctrine" that has developed out of § 4 of the Clayton Act. For an overview of that doctrine, see Note, DischargedEmployees. Should They Ever Have Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 839, 841-53 (1983).
20. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
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the overcharge caused by price fixing, they may pass it on to their cus-

tomers and not suffer any actual harm. But a plaintiff that suffers no
actual harm cannot recover any damages. Thus, an early Supreme
Court case concluded that the plaintiff, a direct purchaser, could not
21
sue for damages because it "may not have [been] injured. . . at all."
According to one commentator, every court confronted with this issue
22
between 1890 and 1960 reached a similar conclusion.

Viewed together, the limitations on the abilities of both direct and
indirect purchasers to recover damages created the possibility that no

party would be able to recover damages from a manufacturer that fixed
prices on products not sold to ultimate consumers. A simple method of
eliminating this anomaly was developed and applied in 1960 in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.23 The trial judge ruled
that the "excessive price is the injury" and therefore the plaintiff, a
direct purchaser, could sue for damages even if it passed on all of the
overcharge. 24 Hanover Shoe was not a price-fixing case. It involved
allegations that United Shoe Machinery (United) "had monopolized
the shoe machinery industry" through practices such as "leasing and
25
refusing to sell its more complicated and important shoe machinery.
1963). The courts have not articulated a clear-cut rule for determining when indirect purchasers' injuries are "too remote" to permit recovery and are apt to reach inconsistent conclusions based on the same facts. The district court in Illinois Brick ruled that the plaintiffs'
injuries were too remote to permit the recovery of damages. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67
F.R.D. 461, 467-68 (N.D. IlM.1975). The circuit court disagreed on this point, Illinois v.
Illinois Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1165 (7th Cir. 1976), and the Supreme Court declined to
address the issue, 431 U.S. at 728 n.7. For useful discussions of the state of the law on
remoteness and standing generally, see Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d
958, 963-65 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1983); Handler, The Shftfrom Substantive to ProceduralInnovalion in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-ThirdAnnualAntitrustReview, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1,2931 (1971).
21. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922).
22. Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32
ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 23-26 (1966).
23. 185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Pa.), a~ffidpercuriam, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 901 (1960). This series of decisions was but part of the protracted litigation that
culminated in the series of decisions discussed infra notes 25-31 & accompanying text.
24. Id. at 829 (emphasis added). The trial court relied in part on an early Supreme
Court case that did not deal with antitrust damages, stating: "The general tendency of the
law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step. As it does not attribute
remote consequences to a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has
sufiered a loss." Id. at 830 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245
U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918)).
25. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 483 (1968). This
case arose after the government already had brought a successful civil action against United.
See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af'dper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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The difference was unimportant in the later measurement of damages.
The district court awarded Hanover damages equal to treble the estimated difference in cost to Hanover of leasing, as opposed to buying,
the machinery.2 6 The Supreme Court affirmed, applying what it referred to as "the general principle that the victim of an overcharge is
27
damaged within the meaning of § 4 to the extent of that overcharge."
The Supreme Court rejected United's argument that Hanover was
not necessarily damaged at all because it recouped, or might have
recouped, any increased costs by passing them on to the buyers of its
shoes. Although the Court could not rule out the possibility of complete
passing on, it concluded that "the task [of proving it] would normally
prove insurmountable. '28 On the other hand, the availability of the
passing-on argument would, in the Court's view, lead to its frequent
use and would "require long and complicated proceedings involving
massive evidence and complicated theories. ' 29 Moreover, the Court
found assigning the exclusive right to recover damages to ultimate consumers unappealing because each consumer "would have only a tiny
30
stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action."
Thus, the Court feared that allowing defendants to assert a passing-on
defense would substantially reduce the deterrent effect of private anti31
trust enforcement.
Nine years later, the Supreme Court was presented in IllinoisBrick
Co. v. Illinois32 with what has been called the "mirror image of Hanover Shoe." 33 Illinois Brick involved a suit by the State of Illinois, on
behalf of itself and numerous local governments in the Chicago area,
seeking damages for injuries caused by an alleged conspiracy to fix the
price of concrete block. The state and local governments did not, as a
rule, purchase the block directly from the alleged price fixers, but they
claimed to have been damaged because contractors that did purchase
the block directly from the price fixers passed on the overcharges to the
state and local governments. Defendants contended that HanoverShoe
26. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Pa. 1965),
afl'd, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967).
27. 392 U.S. 481, 491 (1968).
28. Id. at 493.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 494.
31. Id.
32. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
33. Landes & Posner, Should Indirect PurchasersHave Standingto Sue Under the Antitrust Laws?-An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REv.602, 603
(1979).
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barred the recovery of damages by indirect purchasers. 34 A majority of
the Supreme Court agreed, construing HanoverShoe to hold "that the
overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his business or property.' "35
The Court expressly declined to overrule Hanover Shoe.
The Court's primary reason for allocating the right of potential
damages recovery solely to direct purchasers was that
[t]he apportionment of the recovery throughout the distribution
chain would increase the overall costs of recovery by injecting extremely complex issues into the case; at the same time such apportionment would reduce the benefits to each plaintiff by dividing the
potential recovery among a much larger group. . . . The combination of increasing the costs and diffusing the benefits of bringing a
treble-damages action could
3 6 seriously impair this important weapon
of antitrust enforcement.
The Court also rejected the idea of a rule that prohibits the defensive
use of passing-on, as attempted in Hanover Shoe, but allows the offensive use of passing-on by indirect purchasers seeking damages. The
Court asserted that this type of rule would "create a serious risk of
multiple liability for defendants. '37 Unfortunately, the Illinois Brick
Court failed to set forth clearly why the risk of multiple liability is
38
either socially undesirable or legally impermissible.
The Debate Over Illinois Brick
The evaluation of any policy rule entails determining how well the
rule furthers established goals and what costs it imposes. The courts
and the commentators seem to agree that private treble-damages actions were intended to further two important goals: 1) to compensate in
some fashion the victims of antitrust violations, and 2) to deter antitrust
violations by imposing substantial costs on antitrust violators who are
34. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 727.
35. Id. at 729 (quoting § 4 of the Clayton Act).
36. Id. at 745.
37. Id. at 730.
38. The dissenting Justices argued that the Court's decision
severely undermines the effectiveness of the private treble-damages action as an
instrument of antitrust enforcement ... frustrat[ing] both the compensation and
deterrence objectives of the treble-damages action. Injured consumers are precluded from recovering damages from manufacturers, and direct purchasers who
act as middlemen have little incentive to sue suppliers so long as they may pass on
the bulk of the illegal overcharges to the ultimate consumers.
Id. at 749 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). The dissent also
minimized the additional difficulty that would be introduced by trying to apportion damages
and argued that "as a practical matter, existing procedural mechanisms [could] eliminate
[the] danger [of multiple liability] in most instances." Id. at 761, 758-64.
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caught.3 9 These are the two goals against which Illinois Brick 40 should
be judged.
Whatever effect IllinoisBrick may have on the furtherance of these
goals, there can be little doubt that it has the desirable effect of lowering litigation costs4Q by reducing the number of potential litigants and
by eliminating the complex problem of apportioning damages between
direct and indirect purchasers. Lowering litigation costs is important,
but this effect alone cannot justify Illinois Brick's effect on the goals of
compensation and deterrence. These effects and their relative importance have been the focus of the controversy over Illinois Brick.
One school of thought, most closely associated with Professors
Harris and Sullivan, 4 2 concurs with the Illinois Brick dissenters that
both direct and indirect purchasers should have the right to recover
damages. This view stresses the compensation goal, arguing that direct
purchasers tend to pass on most of the overcharges caused by price
fixing to indirect purchasers. 43 Because indirect purchasers are not permitted to recover under Illinois Brick, the goal of compensation is
frustrated. 44
Harris and Sullivan also contend that Illinois Brick lessens the deterrent effect of private treble damages actions because it assigns the
exclusive right to recover to direct purchasers, who are not likely to
have an incentive to sue. Harris and Sullivan argue that direct purchasers are likely to lack such an incentive to sue because they risk
termination by their suppliers if they do so and because they suffer little
actual harm from the price fix due to passing-on, possibly even benefiting from the price fix by passing on more than one hundred per cent of
45
the overcharge.
39. See, e.g., Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746; Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 485-86 & n.10 (1977); Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 605; Note, supra note 9,
at 1457-61.
40. The term "IllinoisBrick" is used here and throughout the remainder of this Article
as a shorthand for a rule that allows direct purchasers the exclusive right to recover damages
in price-fixing cases and, if successful, recover treble damages based on the full amount of
the overcharge, even if the direct purchasers passed on part or all of that overcharge.
41. See infra notes 65-66 & accompanying text.
42. See Harris & Sullivan, PassingOn the Monopoly Overcharge:A ComprehensivePolicy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979); see also Mantell, Denialof a Forum to IndirectPurchaser Victims of Price-Fixing Conspiracies: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois
Brick, 2 PACE L. REv. 153 (1982).
43. See Harris & Sullivan, supra note 42, at 275-309, 321-38; see also Harris & Sullivan,
PassingOn the Monopoly Overcharge: .4 Response to Landes andPosner, 128 U. PA. L. REv.
1280, 1281-86 (1980).
44. See Harris & Sullivan, supra note 42, at 346-48.
45. Id. at 349-54. Although Professors Harris and Sullivan might be right in some
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Opposing Professors Harris and Sullivan, and agreeing with the
46
Illinois Brick majority, are Professor Landes and Judge Posner.
Landes and Posner stress the deterrence goal, arguing that Illinois
Brick enhances the deterrent effect of private treble-damages actions.
Their rationale is three-fold:
First, the direct purchaser is a more efficient enforcer of the antitrust
laws than the indirect purchaser and should therefore be given maximum incentive to bring antitrust suits. Second, the problem of apportioning damages among direct and indirect purchasers would be
so costly that it would decrease the incentives of any purchaser to
sue. Third, even if direct and indirect purchasers were equally efficient antitrust enforcers, and even if allocation problems could be
solved without seriously depleting the recovery pool, deterrence
would be weakened if the right to sue were divided
among more par47
ties, so that each claim was relatively small.
The superior efficiency of enforcement by direct purchasers stems from
the fact that "[t]he direct purchaser deals directly with the violator, and
probably with his competitors, and he is therefore in a better position
than a more remote purchaser to detect a conspiracy."4 8 Landes and
Posner see no reason why direct purchasers would be reluctant to sue
their suppliers and collect the bounty of treble damages unless they
have been "bribed" in some way, in which case the bribe would have
achieved much the same result as a damages award. 49 They also assert
cases, there are significant gaps in their argument. If price fixers can use the threat of termination to deter direct purchasers from suing, one must wonder why they could not extract all
of the direct purchasers' excess of revenues above avoidable costs, or "quasi-rents." In this
context, costs are avoidable if they need not still be incurred if the firm switches suppliers or
exits from the industry. Of course, if the price fixers already had extracted all of the direct
purchasers' quasi-rents, then the direct purchasers would have nothing to lose and could not
be deterred from suing by the threat of termination. If the price fixers could have extracted
all of the quasi-rents of the direct purchasers but refrained from doing so, there may be good
reasons for continuing to refrain from doing so. See M. Schwartz, Economic Controversies
Raised by Illinois Brick 8-9 (1983) (unpublished manuscript on fie with the authors).
46. See Landes & Posner, supra note 33; see also Landes & Posner, The Economics of
PassingOn: A Reply to Harrisand Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1274 (1980).
47. Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 608-09.
48. Id. at 609.
49. Id. at 613-14; Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 1278.
This counter argument made by Professor Landes and Judge Posner to Professors Harris and Sullivan's argument on this point, see supra note 45 & accompanying text, is even
more implausible than the latter's argument. Landes and Posner assert that if direct purchasers do not sue it is only because they have been bribed not to. There are persuasive
reasons, however, why those bribes would not be offered. An agreement not to reveal illicit
conduct would be illegal and unenforceable, so price fixers would have to seriously doubt
the effectiveness of any such bribes. Furthermore, price fixers would open themselves up to
blackmail if they tried to buy the silence of all direct purchasers. Each direct purchaser
could threaten to expose the conspiracy, with the result of damages payments to all as well
as possible criminal prosecution. If somehow the direct purchasers were able to offer their
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that indirect purchasers will be compensated as fully under Illinois
Brick as under a splitting-the-recovery rule because direct purchasers
50
will lower prices in anticipation of recovery.
Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the arguments relat-

ing to deterrence, a brief discussion of compensation is appropriateparticularly because the two goals are, to some extent, interrelated.
While we agree with Professor Landes and Judge Posner, and the Illinois Brick majority, that deterrence is far more important than com-

pensation,5 1 we must also agree with Professors Harris and Sullivan
that Illinois Brick runs counter to the goal of compensation. It seems
clear that in most cases indirect purchasers suffer significant injuries
from upstream price fixing due to passing-on, yet under Illinois Brick
they cannot recover for their injuries. Landes and Posner's assertion
that indirect purchasers will be compensated as fully under Illinois
Brick as under a "splitting-the-recovery" rule 52 seems quite

implausible.
Any anticipated recovery on the part of the direct purchasers can
not be significant until a price fix is detected by one or more of them.
Thus, indirect purchasers cannot be compensated as fully under Illinois
Brick as under a splitting-the-recovery rule unless conspiracies are detected in their inception. When a conspiracy is detected at any point
after its inception, the indirect purchasers will already have suffered
some injuries due to the passing on of overcharges occuring before detection. In fact, indirect purchasers often may not be compensated at
collective silence, it may pay for the price fixers to purchase that silence with bribes. However, if direct purchasers were able to coordinate their actions well enough to do this, then
they also could form their own cartel and effectively resist any upstream cartelization. Cf. F.
SCHERER, supra note 17, at 300-02 (cartelization "just downstream" must produce profits as
least as great as, and generally greater than, cartelization "just upstream" or cartelization
both downstream and upstream).
50. "[Tjhe choice between the rule of Illinois Brick or its alternative will affect only the
form, and not the amount, of compensation that accrues to ultimate consumers as a group."
Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 606. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 127576.
51. A simple reading of § 4 indicates that compensation was not Congress' primary
goal when it created private treble-damages actions. If it had been, it seems unlikely that
treble rather than single damages would have been authorized. Moreover, the courts have
never placed primary emphasis on compensation. If they had, they would not have denied,
for example, stockholders or ultimate consumers the right to recover damages. See supra
notes 19-20 & accompanying text. Finally, it should be noted that if indirect purchasers
were permitted to recover damages, the costs of locating and paying all those parties that
might have been injured indirectly by upstream price fixing could be so great that the total
award would be substantially depleted and the goal of compensation would be thwarted. See
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 747 & n.31, and sources cited therein.
52. See supra note 50 & accompanying text.
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all because conspiracies to fix prices frequently are detected only when
they collapse and prices fall. If a conspiracy is still ongoing at the time
that it is detected, the participants in the conspiracy, in order to limit
their civil and criminal liability, probably will cease their illegal activities as soon as they learn that the conspiracy has been detected-which
would probably occur shortly after the conspiracy was detected 3-and
the compensation to indirect purchasers probably still would be slight.
Finally, even if there was a significant period during which prices could
be lowered by direct purchasers in anticipation of future recovery, it
seems rather doubtful, practically speaking, that there would be a sig54
nificant price reduction.
Thus, denying indirect purchasers the right to recover damages
under Illinois Brick is contrary to the compensation goal. Nevertheless,
given our premise that the deterrence goal is far more important than
the compensation goal, IllinoisBrick may still be a sound policy choice
if it significantly furthers the goal of deterrence. Whether it does so is
the focus of the next section.
A Model of Private Detection of Price Fixing
A preliminary question presents itself: Is there any way of verifying empirically that Illinois Brick furthers the deterrence goal, at least
on the average? Our response is that probably there is not. The incidence of price fixing is not readily observable and the available indicators are inadequate. A dearth of price fixing cases could mean either
that there was little price fixing or that there was too little detection of
the price fixing. Moreover, detecting collusion is partly a matter of
chance. Thus, the fact that collusion was detected by a particular plaintiff attests partly to that plaintiff's diligence and skill and partly to its
53. Direct purchasers probably would not be able to keep their detection of the conspiracy a secret for long, and would certainly give it away when they filed suit.
54. In the first place, there is considerable risk associated with the anticipated recovery
and, even in a competitive industry, risk-ddverse firms would not lower their prices to the
point where the full expected recovery was passed on to the indirect purchasers. Moreover,
managers in the real world would be particularly reluctant to lower their prices to the point
that, in the short run, they were not earning their cost of capital. See R. McGuckin & R.
Pittman, Deterrence and Compensation Under the Illinois Brick Rule 12-13 (Econ. Policy
Off. Discussion Paper 83-8, 1983); see also Harris & Sullivan, supra note 43, at 1283-84;
Mantell, supra note 42, at 173-75. Even if managers were risk-neutral and behaved as
Landes and Posner suggest, the Landes-Posner result, see supra note 50, would not necessarily follow in cases where direct purchasers had detected collusion and had anticipated future
recovery but indirect purchasers had not detected collusion and had not anticipated recovery. In such cases, compensation of indirect purchasers under IllinoisBrick could be either
more or less than under a splitting-the-recovery rule.
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good fortune. Finally, prior to IllinoisBrick there was not a consistent

rule governing the apportionment of recovery between direct and indirect purchasers, so it would be very difficult to draw any conclusions
from a comparison of the pre- and post-Illinois Brick worlds.

Our goal is to fill at least part of the void caused by the impossibility of empirical determination of Illinois Brick's effect on deterrence by
analyzing its logical implications through the use of an economic
55
model. While our model is considerably simpler than the real world,

it is realistic enough to permit plausible analysis.
We begin with the basic premise that the extent to which private
treble-damages actions deter a potential price fixer depends on 1) the
magnitude of the potential damages award5 6 to which the price fixer is
exposed if successfully sued, and 2) the likelihood that such damages
awards will be made.5 7 This second factor depends primarily on the
likelihood that potential plaintiffs will detect the collusion and subse55. Several significant simplifications in the model should be noted:
1) a plaintiff either collects damages ofa spec(Fedamount as a result of successful litigation, which entails specfed costs, or it gets nothing and incurs specifled costs;
2) settlements, which actually cause a wide range of outcomes, are ignored;
3) collusion is either detected or it is not;
4) as a result of the last simplification, the problem faced by plaintiffs of deciding to
switch from the detection phase to the litigation phase is suppressed;
5) there are no plaintiffs, or plaintiffs' attorneys, who undertake "fishing expeditions" to
detect collusion by means of discovery;
6) potential plaintiffs do not cooperate in trying to detect collusion;
7) there are no "bounty-hunting" lawyers who undertake detection efforts on behalf of
possible future clients; and
8) price fixing is assumed to cease, if it has not already, as soon as a treble-damages
action is brought.
The first simplification has no effect at all on the results derived; it merely avoids the
use of more complicated mathematics. The second simplification has very little effect so
long as treble-damages actions are not baseless attempts to extort payment through quick
settlement. The incentive to invest in detection clearly would be lessened by the ability to
extort payment without investing anything in detection. If such is not possible, inclusion of
settlements in the model would do little more than increase the complexity of the mathematics. The intuition for why the possibility of settlement makes little difference is quite simple.
A plaintiff that really has detected collusion will settle his case only if the defendant offers at
least as much as the expected net return from pursuing the litigation to conclusion. Thus,
the incentive to invest in detection is basically unaffected by the possibility of settlement.
The third, fourth, and fifth simplifications are discussed infra note 62; the sixth and seventh
are discussed infra note 85.
56. At this point, we refer to "damages awards" as meaning the amount that a losing
defendant pays out. Below, we distinguish between the damages "recovery" component of
the total award, which is the damages (usually the overcharge) trebled, and the recovered
"litigation costs" component, which plaintiffs' are awarded under § 4. See infra notes 65, 67.
57. It depends as well, of course, on the possible profits to be made from fixing prices
and the probabilities associated with those profits. The potential for collateral negative effects, such as adverse publicity if caught, also may have an impact.
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quently be able to meet their burdens of proof in court. 58 This likelihood can be reduced to two separate probabilities: 1) the probability
that potential plaintiffs will detect the collusion, and 2) the conditional
probability that, if the collusion is detected, plaintiffs will be able to
prove their case in court. The effect that Illinois Brick may have on
deterrence stems from a change in the probability of detection caused
by a change in the incentives to invest in the detection of price fixing.
The possibility that a potential plaintiff might detect 59 collusion
but decline to file a treble damages suit is ignored in our model. This
entails no significant loss in generality. It is implausible that a potential plaintiff who would find it unprofitable to sue for damages upon
detecting collusion would invest in the detection of collusion. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that such a potential plaintiff nevertheless
would detect collusion. If there were a substantial probability that potential plaintiffs would detect collusion without really trying, then the
existing civil and criminal penalties for price fixing under section 1 of
the Sherman Act 60 should be sufficient to make collusion extremely
rare and diminish the importance of both section 4 of the Clayton Act
and the Illinois Brick debate.
The universe of potential plaintiffs relevant to the detection of any
particular conspiracy can include numerous direct purchasers and, generally, even more numerous indirect purchasers. The latter can include
58. [T]he courts have required [proof] (1) that the plaintiff be injured in fact, (2)
that the injury be to his "business or property," (3) that the injury be of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent, (4) that there be a significant causal connection between the defendant's violation and the plaintiffs injury, and (5) that the
injury flow from that which makes the defendant's act unlawful.
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 334, at 163 (1978). Thus, recovery is by no
means certain even if the violation exists, and "knowing" of a violation is a far cry from
proving it.
59. The definition of "detection" presents a few minor problems. It is defined here,
more or less objectively, as the plaintiff uncovering sufficient evidence to justify the belief
that collusion does exist. As an equivalent alternative, we may define detection as the plaintiff uncovering sufficient evidence that an attorney may sign a complaint seeking damages
without violating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require the attorney to certifly
that the pleading "is well grounded in fact" and which provide for mandatory sanctions for
violations. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Miner & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Promptedthe
New Rules of CiilProcedure, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, 34. Either definition rules
out the possibility of detection via the discovery process following the filing of a suit based
on mere suspicion, as noted in our simplifications set forth supra note 55.
60. Under § 1, price fixing is a felony punishable by a prison sentence of up to three
years or a fine of up to $100,000 for an individual, and $1,000,000 for a corporation, or both.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). In addition, nearly all of the states prohibit price fixing, with a wide
range of civil and criminal penalties. See, e.g., R. Fellmeth & T. Papageorge, A Treatise on
State Antitrust Law and Enforcement 19-24, 51-60 (1978), reprintedas Supplement No.1 to
[July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 892 (Dec. 7, 1978).
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firms at several points in the vertical supply chain, including ultimate
consumers. To help sort out the various issues relating to the effect of
Illinois Brick on deterrence, it is helpful at first to abstract somewhat
from the real world by reducing the number of participants in the
model. Thus, we assume initially that there will be only one direct purchaser and one indirect purchaser and consider how the amount invested in detection may be affected by awarding the exclusive right to
recover to the direct versus the indirect purchaser. Then, we consider
how the existence of large numbers of potential plaintiffs affects the
aggregate level of investment in detecting collusion and the resulting
probability of detection.
One may well ask whether use of this model can verify that Illinois
Brick furthers the deterrence goal. Our answer is, again, probably not.
Even if it were possible to take a census of direct and indirect purchasers and to measure litigation costs and transaction costs, it still would
not be possible to verify whether Illinois Brick furthers deterrence because it would still be impossible to determine the precise nature of the
detection technology, which is critical.
If There Were Only One Direct Purchaser and Only One Indirect
Purchaser, to Which Should the Exclusive Right to Recover Be
Assigned?
Consider a single potential plaintiff that must decide how much to
invest in trying to detect collusion upstream in the vertical supply
chain, knowing that the probability of its success is largely a function of
how much it invests in the effort. An investment of D dollars yields a
probability of detecting collusion of P(D). Investing more increases the
probability of detection, but it does so at a decreasing rate--e., the
investment of each additional dollar will cause a positive incremental
effect on the probability of detection, but the amount of each incremental effect will decrease as the amount invested increases. 6 1 If, and only
if, collusion is detected, will the plaintiff sue for damages and recover
treble the amount of the overcharge with a probability designated as 0.
It is assumed that if the price-fixing conspiracy has not already broken
down, the suit would cause the price fix to end even if the plaintiff were
62
unsuccessful and no damages were awarded.
61.

The reader interested in learning more about economic models and the basic math-

ematics of optimization should consult, e.g., W.

BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 3-5, 21-27, 42-51, 57-59 (4th ed. 1977); A. CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL

METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 8-10, 164-79, 184-88, 243-66 (2d ed. 1974).
62. See supra note 55. Further, even though the processes of detection and litigation
are dynamic ones occuring over a long period of time, it is assumed that these processes

March 1984]

ILLINOIS BRICK AND DETERRENCE

Choosing D to Maximize Expected Profits

Thus, the problem confronted by the potential plaintiff is to choose
the detection investment, D, that will maximize the plaintiff's expected
profits 63 which can be represented by the following expression:
[I - P(D)][,rr - D] + P(D)(1 - 0) [rr - D - L - T](1)
+ P(D)O[qr - D - T + R].

The three terms in expression (1) represent the payoffs in the three pos-

sible outcomes of the plaintiff's investment in detection, multiplied by
their respective probabilities.
The first term represents the outcome when collusion is not detected, which occurs with the probability 1 - P(D). In this outcome, the
64
firm expects a certain amount of profits from its business operations,
° while losing the amount spent on its unsuccessful effort to detect
,rO,

collusion, D. In this outcome, since there is no litigation, no "litigation" or "transaction" costs are incurred and there is no recovery.
The second term represents the outcome when collusion is detected but the suit is unsuccessful. This occurs with probability P(D)(l
- 0), where 0 is the probability that a suit is successful in recovering
damages. In this case, the firm expects certain profits from its business
operations, rr1, while losing the amount spent on detecting the collusion, D, "litigation costs,"' 65 L, and "transaction costs,"' 66 T, represented
by 70 - D - L - T. The firm's expectation of profits of iTr rather than

WO reflects, for example, the increase in expected profits caused by the
occur instantaneously. This assumption does not affect the major qualitative results derived.
Adding time to this model would simply require the addition of discounting factors to the
various terms in, for example, expression (1), reflecting the fact that the rewards from detecting collusion are reaped some years after the investment is made and future dollars are
worth less than present dollars.
63. For simplicity, it is assumed that the firms in the model are risk-neutral-ie., the
firms are indifferent between an uncertain lottery with an expected payoff of X and a certain
payoff of the same amount. Risk-adverse firms will invest less than risk-neutral firms, other
things being equal, but the qualitative results derived below, involving direct versus indirect
purchasers and the number of potential plaintiffs, are unaffected by attitudes towards risk
unless they differ significantly between direct and indirect purchasers.
64. For simplicity, we consider only potential plaintiffs that are business firms. However, the model applies equally well to ultimate consumers if profits are reinterpreted as real
purchasing power.
65. "Litigation costs" include all costs recoverable under § 4, including attorneys' fees,
witness fees, copying costs, and so forth.
66. "Transaction costs" include all costs associated with litigation not recoverable
under § 4, including fees of nontestimonial consultants and the salaries and wages paid to
plaintiffs' employees for helping to prepare the litigation or testify in it.
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ending of the price-fixing conspiracy. The distinction between the liti-

gation and transaction costs is meant to correspond with the fact that
certain costs, "litigation costs," are recoverable after a successful suit
while others, "transaction costs," are not. Thus, unsuccessful litigation
causes the loss of both L and T, while successful litigation entails the
loss of T only.
The final term represents the outcome when the firm both detects

collusion and successfully sues for damages. This occurs with a
probability P(D)O. The firm expects certain profits while losing the
amount spent on detection and transaction costs and gaining the recovery,67 all of which is represented by 7r' - D - T + R.
To maximize expected profits, a firm will invest in any particular
activity up to the point at which an additional dollar of investment
yields an expected return of one dollar. In this model, this means that

the potential plaintiff firm will invest in detecting collusion up to the
point at which an additional dollar of investment in detecting collusion
yields an expected return of one dollar. This point occurs at the value
of D that satisfies the following expression:
P'(D) = 1/[r - a° -

T

- (1 - O)L + OR].

(2)

The quantity in the brackets is the expected net benefit gained by
bringing a treble-damages action given that collusion has been detected.68 The net benefit is assumed to be positive, and P'(D) is the
69
derivative of P(D).

Examining expression (2), we observe how changes in the values
of the various variables affect the amount invested in detection and the
67. The term "recovery" as used here is the damages award itself, generally the overcharge trebled, not including costs and attorney's fees awarded under § 4.
68. If collusion is detected, the probability of detection, P(D), equals one. Thus, the
firm expects to get profits equal to expression (1) evaluated at P(D) = 1. Noting that the first
term in expression (1) equals zero if P(D) = 1 and that portions of the latter two terms cancel
1
each other out, we see that expression (1) evaluated at P(D) = 1is Ir - D - T - (I - O)L +
OR. If no suit is brought, the firm will get get profits of iTO - D, and subtracting this from
the previous expression yields the term in brackets in expression (2).
69. Le., for any D, P'(D) is the slope of P(D). The derivative of P(D), P'(D), is important here because economic decisions are made at the margin. The potential plaintiff evaluates the marginal benefit and marginal cost of each dollar invested and invests up to the
point where marginal benefit just equals the marginal cost. In the model, the marginal benefit decreases as additional dollars are invested in the detection of collusion. This is because
the probability of detection was assumed to increase at a decreasing rate as additional dollars are invested, that is, at higher levels of investment the probability-of-detection function
is flatter than it is at lower levels of investment. Thus, its derivative, or slope, decreases as
additional dollars are invested. See supra note 61.
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resulting probability of detection. An increase in -rr - ,rro, R, or 0 increases the expected net benefit of the treble-damages action that would
be brought if collusion is detected, and therefore results in an increase
in both the amount that will be invested in detection and the resulting
probability of detection. An increase in T or L decreases the expected
net benefit of the treble-damages action, and therefore results in a decrease in both the amount that will be invested in detection and the
70
resulting probability of detection.
Choosing the Plaintf-Director IndirectPurchaser?
Assume that there is one direct purchaser and one indirect purchaser and that the issue is which of these purchasers is the appropriate
potential plaintiff. There is no reason to believe that T, L, or 0 is affected by whether the potential plaintiff is a direct or indirect purchaser. Although Illinois Brick could affect all three of these variables,
the effect would relate to the number of potential plaintiffs-not
whether they were direct or indirect purchasers. For example, if a large
number of indirect purchasers are potential plaintiffs, T and L may be
70. Note that an increase in L reduces the expected net benefit even though litigation
costs are recoverable, because of the possibility that the action will be unsuccessful.
All the foregoing can be explained as follows. An increase (decrease) in the expected
net benefit from a treble-damages action will cause a decrease (increase) in the right-hand
side of the equation in expression (2). An equivalent decrease (increase) in the left-hand
side will be necessary to maintain equality. Since, by our assumption, P'(D) falls as D rises,
decreasing (increasing) the left-hand side of the equation requires increasing (decreasing) D.
This can be demonstrated formally by totally differentiating expression (2):

-(P'(D)/[P'(D)] 2)dD = d(,rr' -

'rr)

- dT - (1 - 0)dL + OdR + (R + L)de.

2

Defining A as -[P'(D)] /P"(D), and recognizing that P"(D) < 0 so A > 0, we get
dD

-

A>0

d(r' - iTO)
dD -

-A <0

dT
dD
dL

dD
d
dR

-

-(I-8)A<0

-

OA>0

dD
d8- =(R + L)A > 0.
Now, since P'(D) > 0, it follows that increasing (decreasing) D also increases (decreases)

P(D).
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higher than if only a small number of direct purchasers are potential
plaintiffs. 71 But this stems from the difference in numbers, not from the
fact that the potential plaintiffs are indirect, as opposed to direct, purchasers. In addition, since it is assumed that R includes the full overcharge caused by the price fix, whether the plaintiff is a direct or
indirect purchaser does not affect R. Thus, the choice between a direct
1 - rOor on
and an indirect purchaser must turn on differences in -rr
differences in the probability-of-detection function, P(D).
If the probability-of-detection function is the same for both direct
and indirect purchasers, the one that would invest the most in detection
is the one that has the highest r I - "rr° , ie., the one that profits the most
from stopping an ongoing conspiracy. In this simple model there is one
direct and one indirect purchaser, and the one that benefits the most
from stopping an ongoing conspiracy could easily be the indirect purchaser because it is reasonably likely that most of the overcharge suffered by the one direct purchaser will be passed on to the one indirect
purchaser. In addition, if conspirators can credibly threaten to terminate direct purchasers should they sue, as Professors Harris and Sullivan suggest, 72 it becomes even more likely that indirect purchasers will
have more to gain from stopping the conspiracy. On the other hand, it
can be argued that either the direct purchaser or the indirect purchaser
likely would invest in detection because of the lure of bounty R. This
is true even if the conspiracy is known to have ceased already and "rrI WO equals zero. Indeed, even if "rrI - 7rO is negative for the direct purchaser because it passes on more than a hundred percent of the overcharge, the direct purchaser probably still would find it profitable to
invest in detecting collusion because, due partly to the trebling under
section 4, R is likely to be quite large. To simplify matters, it is assumed that either the direct or the indirect purchaser would invest in
73
detection.
Now assume that rr - rro is the same for the direct and indirect
71. Although the effect may not be significant, increasing the number of plaintiffs is
likely to increase the total number of attorneys involved and the total number of hours
billed, as well as the length if not the number of pleadings. It also could increase the
number of separate lawsuits filed. All of these things increase litigation costs. See supra
note 65. In addition, increasing the number of plaintiffs is likely to increase the total costs of
plaintiffs' employees' work on the case and thereby increase transaction costs. See supra
note 66.
72. See Harris & Sullivan, supra note 42, at 351-53. For our response to this suggestion, and to Professor Landes and Judge Posner's counter-argument, see supra notes 45, 49.
73. It is possible that Trl - r° is both positive and sufficiently large that a potential
plaintiff, whether a direct or indirect purchaser, would invest in detecting collusion even if
denied any possible recovery. However, it is assumed that this is not the case.
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purchasers, and that they differ only in that they have different
probability-of-detection functions, P(D). Professor Landes and Judge
Posner persuasively argue that direct purchasers are closer to the price
fixers and therefore have better access than indirect purchasers to the
information most relevant to detecting collusion. 74 Thus, direct purchasers are likely to be more efficient detectors in the sense that, for any
positive, finite level of investment, the direct purchasers would achieve
a greater probability of detection. Landes and Posner assert that this
implies that direct purchasers should have the exclusive right to recovery. Their rationale is that this would cause more to be invested in
detection and the probability of detection to be greater. 75 However, in
our model, with one direct purchaser and one indirect purchaser, the
superior efficiency of the direct purchaser, as defined here, has no such
implication. It is the incremental effect on the probability of detection
of an additional dollar spent, given by P'(D), rather than the
probability of detection itself, that is important in determining how
much will be invested. Superior efficiency as defined here has no particular implications for P'(D).
The example depicted in the figure on the following page illustrates why the fact that direct purchasers are more efficient detectors of
upstream collusion than indirect purchasers has no implications for
P(D). In the upper panel of the figure, the probability-of-detection
function for the indirect purchaser, Po(D), is plotted. Also plotted are
three alternative probability-of-dection functions for the direct purchaser, PI(D), P2 (D), and P 3(D). Each of these three functions lies
76
above Po(D) for all positive, finite levels of investment.
Thus, with any one of the three alternative functions the direct
purchaser would be a more efficient detector than the indirect purchaser-in keeping, for argument's sake, with Landes and Posner's assertion. However, with these probability-of-detection functions, both
the amount invested, D, and probability of detection, P, can be either
more or less for the direct purchaser than for the indirect purchaser.
74. Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 608-09.
75. Id.
76. There is no basis for drawing any of the probability-of-detection functions as
shown in the figure other than to merely illustrate various theoretical possibilities. This
example illustrates the fact that because one probability-of-detection function lies above
another implies nothing about either the relative amounts that would be invested or the
resulting relative probabilities of detection. This could also be shown with an example that
featured a single probability-of-detection function for the direct purchaser in our model and
three alternative functions for the indirect purchaser.
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In the lower panel of the figure, we have plotted the derivative
function of each function in the upper panel, ie., the slope at each
point on the graph of the function in the upper panel. We also have
plotted the graph of the constant, C, which is equal to the right-hand
side of the equation in expression (2). For each probability-of-detection function, the expected-profit-maximizing level of investment is
then determined in the lower panel by locating the intersection of the
function's derivative function and the constant, C. Assuming, as we
are, that the direct and indirect purchasers have the same values for all
the parameters that determine C, the optimal expenditures would be as
shown on the horizontal axis of the graph in the lower panel. For each
value of optimal expenditures, the corresponding probability of detection is found by following a dashed line up to the relevant probabilityof-detection function in the upper panel, then reading the resulting
probability off the vertical axis. With Po(D), the indirect purchaser
would invest D5 and have a probability of detection of Po(D5). With
PI(D), the direct purchaser would invest D, and have a probability of
detection of P1 (D;), which is greater than Po(D5). This, most likely, is
the result Landes and Posner envisioned. With Po(D), the direct purchaser would invest DI, which is less than D5, and still have a higher
probability of detection. This also would be consistent with the conclusion of Landes and Posner. However, with P 3 (D), the direct purchaser
would choose D;, both investing less than the indirect purchaser and
having a lower probability of detection. This is inconsistent with
Landes and Posner's conclusion.
There is no reason to suppose that the probability-of-detection
function of the direct purchaser is more likely to resemble PI(D) or
P2 (D) than P3 (D). Each exhibits a kink 77 reflecting the fact that there is
much useful evidence that can be acquired relatively cheaply by direct
purchasers, and that when all such evidence has been examined, it becomes much more costly to increase the likelihood that collusion will
be detected. Therefore, in our model, with its one direct purchaser and
one indirect purchaser, the fact that the direct purchaser is a more efficient detector, as Landes and Posner assert, does not imply that assigning the exclusive right to recover damages to the direct purchaser
will enhance the probability that collusion will be detected.
Conclusion
The foregoing demonstrates that, if there were just one direct and
77. A "kink" is a corner, though not necessarily a sharp one. Technically, a "kink" is a
point at which there is a jump in the function's derivative or slope.
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one indirect purchaser, there would be little basis for assigning the exclusive recovery right to the direct purchaser. It seems as likely as not
that the assignment of the exclusive recovery right to the indirect purchaser instead of the direct purchaser would lead to a greater
probability that collusion will be detected. This is mainly because of
the likelihood that the direct purchaser will pass on a large portion of
the overcharge caused by the price fix and thereby give the indirect
purchaser a greater incentive to invest in detection because it is harmed
more. The only clear-cut advantage in assigning the recovery right to
the direct purchaser is that the costs of achieving any given level of
deterrence would be minimized. Assuming that direct purchasers are
likely to be more efficient at detecting collusion than indirect purchasers, assigning the recovery rights to the indirect purchaser could cause a
waste of resources in the detection of collusion. That the direct purchaser will have lower detection costs does not imply, however, that
assigning the recovery right to direct purchasers would be desirable,
because it does not follow that lower detection costs will necessarily
lead to either a greater investment in detection or an increased likelihood that collusion will be detected.
How Should Recovery Rights Be Allocated When There Are Many
Potential Plaintiffs?
A price-fixing conspiracy in a market with many direct and indirect purchasers, rather than only one direct and one indirect purchaser,
requires a more complicated model for analyzing the assignment of the
right to recover damages. Consider a situation involving the same conspiracy as before, with the same effects on prices and the same quantities of the price-fixed product sold, and how matters are changed if
there are many direct and many indirect purchasers instead of only one
of each.7 8
This more complex situation changes three components of expression (2), which determines the optimal level of investment for an individual potential plaintiff. Two of these changes affect the right-hand
side of expression (2). A multiplicity of direct and indirect purchasers
who are potential plaintiffs reduces the expected net benefit of a trebledamages action for each potential plaintiff, as the pie must be divided
78. Since the quantity sold of the price-fixed product is the same in this case as it was in
the simpler case, the implication of having more direct purchasers is that each of them
purchases much less than the single direct purchaser in the simpler case. Having more indirect purchasers may have a similar implication or it may mean that there are more downstream links in the vertical supply chain.
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into more pieces. Consequently, each potential plaintiff has a diminished incentive to detect collusion than it would if it were the sole potential plaintiff. The presence of many potential plaintiffs also may
increase total litigation and transaction costs and thereby further re79
duce the incentive for each potential plaintiff to detect collusion.
The presence of many potential plaintiffs trying to detect collusion
also affects the left-hand side of expression (2). Since all potential
plaintiffs stand to benefit if any one potential plaintiff detects collusion,
there is an important interdependence in the detection process that may
cause the aggregate investment in detecting collusion to decrease. To
simplify matters, we consider these effects on expression (2) separately.
Reduction of Expected Net Benefits
Having more potential plaintiffs but the same quantity sold of the
price-fixed product causes the expected net benefit of a treble-damages
action, represented by the term in brackets on the right-hand side of
expression (2), to be smaller for each individual potential plaintiff.
Each plaintiff would recover only the portion of the overcharge it had
borne and presumably each would be required to pay a proportional
share of the litigation and transaction costs. In addition, each plaintiff
would receive only a fraction of the total increase in business profits
from stopping the conspiracy. These factors would cause each potential plaintiff to have a correspondingly diminished incentive to invest in
detecting collusion. The impact of a reduction of incentive to detect on
the aggregate investment in detection is considered below in conjunction with the interdependence effect. At this point, however, it is useful
to consider how a multiplicity of potential plaintiffs affects the relative
incentives of individual direct purchasers and indirect purchasers.
The relative incentives to invest in detecting collusion for individual direct and indirect purchasers depend on the relative expected net
benefits from a treble-damages action. The relative expected net benefit of each potential plaintiff would depend on the portion of the overcharge that is passed on to that plaintiff, the "passing-on rate," and on
the market share of that plaintiff. Unlike the situation with a single
direct and a single indirect purchaser, a high passing-on rate need not
result in higher expected net benefit for the individual indirect purchaser. Suppose there were ten identical direct purchasers and a thousand indirect purchasers all of which were just one link below the direct
purchasers on the vertical supply chain. Even with a passing-on rate of
79.

See supra note 71.
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ninety percent, each direct purchaser would benefit much more from a
treble-damages action than each indirect purchaser. Indeed, that
would be the case even if there were no litigation and transaction costs
and no expected recovery. Although indirect purchasers as a group
may suffer more from an upstream price fix than direct purchasers as a
group, the smaller numbers of direct purchasers may cause individual
direct purchasers to have a greater incentive to detect collusion than
individual indirect purchasers.
However, whether this generally will be the case is unclear. Often
there are significantly more indirect than direct purchasers, particularly
when there is collusion far upstream from the ultimate consumers in a
vertical supply chain with several indirect purchaser links.80 Such is
not always the case, but, even if it were, an extremely high passing-on
rate could cause indirect purchasers to have a greater incentive to invest in detecting collusion because they would be hit with a larger portion of the overcharge. Of course, the incentive of either the direct or
the indirect purchasers to detect collusion would be significantly
greater if either group, not both groups, were assigned the exclusive
right to recover damages.
Increase in Litigation and Transaction Costs
As in other kinds of litigation, increasing the number of potential
plaintiffs in a treble-damages action may cause an increase in the aggregate litigation and transaction costs. 8 ' This effect may not be particularly significant; however, other things being equal, any increase in
litigation and transaction costs would decrease the aggregate incentive
to detect collusion. Indeed, it could be argued that there should be
only one potential plaintiff for this reason alone. Theoretically, limiting recovery to a single potential plaintiff would maximize the incentive to detect collusion, but this limitation is not among the realistic
policy options available. The more realistic choices are to allow the
potential plaintffs to include: 1) all direct purchasers; 2) all indirect purchasers; 3) all of the indirect purchasers at some particular link in the
vertical supply chain, such as the ultimate consumers; and 4) all direct
and indirect purchasers. Although the number of potential plaintiffs
alone may not significantly affect litigation and transaction costs, any
80. If each direct purchaser had as customers 10 indirect purchasers and each of them
sold to 100 ultimate consumers, the number of indirect purchasers would be more than 1000
times the number of direct purchasers.
81. See supra note 71.
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of the first three options may be preferred over the fourth because the
numbers involved are sure to be smaller.
A much more important reason for preferring either the first or
third option over the second or fourth option is that the former allow
avoidance of the costs associated with apportioning the recovery between direct and indirect purchasers. 82 This is a point stressed by the
Illinois Brick majority 83 as well as by Professor Landes and Judge Posner, 84 and it is important because apportioning the recovery among extremely large numbers of plaintiffs at many different links in the
vertical supply chain could increase litigation and transaction costs significantly. Assigning recovery rights to all indirect purchasers but not
to any direct purchasers generally would not eliminate apportionment
costs because in most cases there will be several groups of indirect purchasers located at various links in the vertical supply chain. As between the first and third options, the former is likely to be preferable
(although possibly only slightly so) in most instances because direct
purchasers generally are fewer in number than the indirect purchasers
at any particular link in the chain. Thus, this second effect of an increase in the number of potential plaintiffs may favor assigning direct
purchasers the exclusive right to recover damages, and definitely counsels against dividing the recovery between direct and indirect
purchasers.
Interdependence Effect
The existence of multiple potential plaintiffs produces an interdependence effect that changes the left-hand side of expression (2). With
many potential plaintiffs, the probability-of-detection function is a
function of the amount invested by each potential plaintiff and indicates the probability that at least one of them will detect collusion. If
any potential plaintiff detects collusion, all will participate in the suit
for treble damages and all will share in any recovery. With a large
82. See supra text accompanying note 36 and infra note 83.
83. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731-32, 737, 741-45. The extent of these apportionment
costs is an empirical issue on which there is little data. However, it would be the courts that
control the nature of apportionment proceedings and, therefore, also the costs of apportionment. Thus, the Supreme Court's view on this matter must be given great weight. It should
also be pointed out, as the Court has, that the fact that the recovery would be split into
uncertain portions creates additional risk that may significantly discourage investment in
detection. See id. at 745. This conclusion does not emerge from the model because risk
neutrality was assumed. On the other hand, it must be conceded that there may be cases in
which the costs of apportioning the recovery will be relatively low. See R. McGuckin & R.
Pittman, supra note 54, at 19-24.
84. Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 609, 615-21.
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number of potential plaintiffs, each potential plaintiff has a very limited
effect on the probability that collusion will be detected. The investment
of an additional dollar in detection by a particular potential plaintiff
will increase the probability of detection much less if there are many
other potential plaintiffs trying to detect collusion than if that particular potential plaintiff were the only potential plaintiff. This is true because there is a significant likelihood that one of those other potential
plaintiffs will succeed in its detection effort, in which case that additional dollar invested by that particular potential plaintiff will contribute nothing. Thus, there is an important interdependence among
potential plaintiffs.
A critical feature of the probability-of-detection function determines the nature and extent of this interdependence. If, in their separate efforts to detect collusion, potential plaintiffs would examine much
of the same kinds of information in the same order, then additional
plaintiffs do not contribute to the overall detection effort. Viewed in
conjunction with the fact that they share the recovery (the first effect of
multiple potential plaintiffs), this would cause each potential plaintiff to
invest less in detection and would make the probability of detection
lower than in the case of a single potential plaintiff. On the other hand,
if potential plaintiffs examine substantially different kinds of information, then additional potential plaintiffs may have a positive effect on
the aggregate detection effort, causing an increase in the aggregate investment in detection of collusion. Indeed, if the efforts of potential
plaintiffs are synergistic, then the interdependence will have a positive
effect, encouraging each potential plaintiff to invest more than otherwise would be the case.85 These results are more easily seen in a series
of examples.
First, consider the extreme case in which all potential plaintiffs ex85. Cooperation in detection, which would eliminate the interdependence effect, is unlikely for many reasons. In the first place, cooperative activities of competitors would be
suspect under the antitrust laws. Antitrust concerns aside, there will be a powerful tendency
for each potential plaintiff to try to "free-ride" on the detection efforts of others since all can
sue for damages if any one detects. This free-rider tendency would prevent potential plaintiffs from participating in a workable cooperative detection scheme if it were possible to
design one. Moreover, it seems unlikely that a workable cooperative detection scheme could
be devised. A scheme in which potential plaintiffs mutually pledged to try to detect on their
own and share their results would fail because it would not be possible for the group to
monitor the detection activities of its members and the free-rider tendency would keep each
from fulfilling its pledge. Even without these problems, firms would be very reluctant to
provide the relevant information to rivals because it likely would be competitively sensitive.
A scheme in which all potential plaintiffs hired a third party, such as a lawyer, to detect on
its own would be extremely inefficient because it is the potential plaintiffs that have the best
access to much of the most useful information.
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amine exactly the same kinds of information in exactly the same order.
The probability that at least one potential plaintiff will detect collusion
in this case is simply the greatest probability of detecting collusion by

any individual plaintiff. This is symbolically represented, for n potential plaintiffs, by expression (3) where max [ ] denotes the greatest
element in the series inside the brackets:
Pn(D.)].

P = maxIP,(Dl), P2D2) ....

(3)

Although all potential plaintiffs would examine exactly the same information in exactly the same order in their respective efforts to detect
collusion, it is still possible that one or more of the potential plaintiffs

can acquire and examine this information at a lower cost than the
others. Thus, their individual probability-of-detection functions may be
different.
In equilibrium 86 only one potential plaintiff will invest anything in
detecting collusion. Consider the problem of an individual potential
plaintiff, denoted number 1, choosing a level of investment to maximize
expected profits given that all other potential plaintiffs will spend nothing. This problem is identical to that analyzed in the simple case above
except that number 1 now receives only a fraction of the total benefits

from detecting collusion and pays only a fraction of the litigation costs.
Because of this, number 1 would choose a level of investment that
would be less than if there were no other potential plaintiffs sharing the
benefits of recovery and the costs of litigation. 87 Now consider what
86. The equilibrium concept used here is "Nash, noncooperative equilibrium," which
is defined as an outcome in which each player's independent action is optimal, taking as
given the actions of the others. See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 170-71
(1957). The Nash, noncooperative equilibrium concept would be inappropriate if it were
possible for all potential plaintiffs to cooperate and if the costs of doing so were relatively
small. In such a case, they would contract among themselves to eliminate any adverse interdependence effects. We assume, as the courts and other commentators have, cf. Illinois
Brick, 431 U.S. at 725-26; Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 609-11, that such a cooperative
solution is not feasible with respect to detection. Class actions may permit a cooperation of
sorts in litigation, but in no way affect detection. See supra note 85.
87. The level of investment that will be chosen must satisfy the following expression:
P, (DI) = I/ {it l

-or

°

+ X, [- T

-

(I

-

O)L + OR]}

X, is number l's share of the total recovery and litigation and transaction costs, while T, L,
and R represent the total quantities for all direct and indirect purchasers as a group and 'rrl
- 7r° is the net effect of stopping the conspiracy on number l's business profits. If, as assumed above, the quantity in brackets is positive, the right-hand side of the equation is
greater than it would be if X, equalled one, as would be the case if number I were the only
potential plaintiff. And because it was assumed that P,(DI) decreases as D, increases, it
must be the case that the value of D1 chosen will be less than that if XI equalled one.
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other potential plaintiffs would do if they knew that number 1 was investing as just described. Another potential plaintiff would find itself
no better off if it began investing in detection unless it spent the amount
required to cause its probability of detection to exceed number l's
probability of detection. Unless this other potential plaintiff is much
more efficient than the number 1, it will find spending this much undesirable and will spend nothing. If another potential plaintiff does spend
that much, then number 1 will be contributing nothing to detection and
will reduce its expenditures to zero.
Thus, in equilibrium only one potential plaintiff will spend anything on detection, and since any potential plaintiff could be "number
1," there will be more than one equilibrium unless one of the potential
plaintiffs is a much more efficient detector than the others. Indeed, if
the various potential plaintiffs all have very similar individual
probability-of-detection functions, any one of them may be the one
spending in equilibrium. Moreover, because the one plaintiff that does
spend on detection will have to share the benefits of recovery and the
costs of litigation, the amount spent on detecting collusion and the
probability that collusion will be detected will be lower than if that one
potential plaintiff were given the exclusive right of recovery.
A very similar result is obtained if all potential plaintiffs had the
same information available to them but did not duplicate their detection activities. Suppose that each potential plaintiff could obtain the
same information as all others at the same cost and that each potential
plaintiff could avoid examining any evidence that was already examined by another. The probability of detection in this case will be a
function of the sum of the expenditures of the individual potential
plaintiffs, symbolically represented by expression 4:

P=P(D1 +D 2 +-

. .+D.

(4)

This is the one case examined by Professor Landes and Judge Posner,
and the equilibrium is as they described.8 8 If, given that collusion has
been detected, there is a potential plaintiff that expects a significantly
larger net benefit from a treble-damages action than any other potential plaintiff, then there is a unique equilibrium in which only that potential plaintiff invests in detection. This plaintiff will choose a level of
investment to satisfy expression (2), with the right-hand side modified
88. See Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 622-24 & n.42. Their expressions (8)-(l 1)
are written slightly differently than the expressions set forth here, but are essentially
equivalent.
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because it receives only a fraction of the benefits and pays only a fraction of the litigation costs. The amount that this plaintiff will invest
and the resulting probability that collusion will be detected will be
lower than if this potential plaintiff had the exclusive right of recovery
and, therefore, received the full benefits of recovery while paying all
the litigation costs. 89
Now consider a case in which there is some duplication of effort
but each potential plaintiff also has something unique to contribute to
the overall detection effort in that each potential plaintiff either has
access to information that the others do not or, at least, each can obtain
some information at a lower cost than all others.90 There are many
probability-of-detection functions that exhibit these properties. To
make the analysis as simple as possible, we consider the case in which
the potential plaintiffs are identical in all respects and the aggregate
probability-of-detection function is quadratic.91 Symbolically, the aggregate probability, P, is represented by expression (5):

89. If two or more potential plaintiffs share the largest expected net benefit of a treble
damages action, there will be an infinite number of possible equilibria, each of which entails
the same total investment in detecting collusion as would occur if a single potential plaintiff
had the largest expected net benefit from a treble-damages action. There are an infinite
number of possible equilibria because this level of investment can be divided among two or
more potential plaintiffs in infinitely many ways.
90. It is at least possible that both direct and indirect purchasers have available to them
information that is useful in detecting collusion and that the information each has is much
more useful in conjunction with the information of others than it is in isolation. If this were
the case, then for any given level of total investment the greatest probability of detection
would be achieved by splitting the recovery among potential plaintiffs. The total amount
invested in detecting collusion and the probability that collusion will be detected would fall
if the number of potential plaintiffs was reduced from two to one. We do not, however,
believe this to be the usual case.
91. The quadratic specification is adopted because of the simplicity of analysis it permits, i e., simplifying the derivations. There is no particular economic basis for this specification. Indeed, it is not consistent with all of the assumptions about the probability-ofdetection function made above. A quadratic function increases over part of its range and
decreases over part of its range, whereas it was assumed above that the probability-of-detection function was increasing throughout its range for increasing amounts of investment.
Still, the increasing portion of a quadratic function is a reasonable specification, at least for
illustrative purposes, because it effectively captures the various phenomena one would expect to find in the real world and is flexible enough to allow these phenomena to vary in
relative importance.
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-(P3/2)(D2 + D2 +...
+ DD)
+ DD)
-8(DD 2 + DD 3 + DID 4 +..
-8(D 2D 3 + D 2D 4 +. • • +D 2 D)

(5)

-SD._ID.
92
The parameters at, 3, and 8 are all positive numbers.
The effect of the interdependence among potential plaintiffs in the
quadratic case depends on the values of the parameters in the
probability-of-detection function, especially on 8/03. An examination
of the probability-of-detection function indicates why this is the case.
Expression (5) contains two types of terms that enter the function negatively. One type contains the square of each potential plaintiffs investment in detecting collusion multiplied by 3/2. The other contains the
product of one potential plaintiffs investment and the investment of
another potential plaintiff multiplied by 8. Thus, the parameter 8 reflects the extent to which the efforts of different potential plaintiffs involve wasteful duplication, while 3 reflects the rate at which each
potential plaintiff's incremental productivity falls as it invests more in
detection. If 8 is large relative to 13, the duplication-of-effort effect is
stronger than the diminishing-returns-to-individual-effort effect, and it
will be seen that for any given level of aggregate investment, the greatest probability of detection is achieved if all is invested by a single potential plaintiff. If this condition is met, there may be said to be a
"natural monopoly" in detecting collusion. This natural-monopoly
condition is sufficient, but not necessary, to guarantee that the total
amount invested in detecting collusion and the probability that it will
be detected will be greater with one potential plaintiff than with two or
more potential plaintiffs. 93 On the other hand, if 13 is large relative to 8,

92. These three parameters are simply numbers, the values of which have not been
specified in advance. Parameters are used to allow flexibility. As will be seen presently,
depending on the values, particularly the relative values, assumed by parameters, different
effects predominate and different results are obtained.
93. If reducing the number of potential plaintiffs from two to one would increase the
amount invested in detecting collusion, then it can be shown that reducing the number of
potential plaintiffs from n to m, m < n, also would increase the amount invested-unless m
is so large that nothing would be invested. The reverse, however, is not true. If reducing the
number of plaintiffs from two to one would decrease the amount invested in detecting collusion, reducing the number of potential plaintiffs from n to m might increase or decrease the
amount invested.
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it will be seen that the greatest probability of detection is achieved if
the investment is spread among many potential plaintiffs.
These implications can be seen by analyzing the equilibrium produced by the quadratic probability-of-detection function and considering some numerical examples. If n, the number of potential plaintiffs, is
less than or equal to ot/C, 9 4 where C is the entire right-hand side of the
equation in expression (2), with qrt , 7ro, T, L, and R defined as industry
aggregate values, 95 the equilibrium level of investment in detecting collusion for each potential plaintiff is represented by expression (6):96

(a - nC)/[P + (n - 1)8].

(6)

94. If n is greater than or equal to a-/C, nothing will be invested in detecting collusion.
For n = a/C, the equilibrium level of investment given by expressions (6) and (7) is exactly
zero. For n > a/C, expressions (6) and (7) indicate that the equilibrium level of investment
is negative, but it is not possible to invest a negative amount, so zero will be invested. Ifn >
a/C, the derivative of the probability-of-detection function is below the C line for all nonnegative values of investment.
95. It is assumed that -Tri, ITO, T, L, and R all are independent of the number of potential plaintiffs. Adding potential plaintiffs, therefore, only means that each of them pays a
smaller proportion of transaction and litigation costs and receives a smaller proportion of
the recovery.
96. The condition that defines the equilibrium is the same as expression (2), with three
exceptions. First, there is a separate equation for each of the n potential plaintiffs, and all n
equations must be satisfied in equilibrium. Second, the left-hand sides of these n equations
are the (partial) derivatives of the probability-of-detection function with respect to each Di,
the amount invested by each potential plaintiff. Third, since all potential plaintiffs were
assumed to be identical, the right-hand sides of the n equations are the same, but they differ
from that in expression (2) in that each potential plaintiff has only a I/n share of the costs
and benefits of detecting collusion. The right-hand sides of the equations, thus, are:
l/[,rl/n - 7r0/n - T/n - (I -

O)L/n + OR/n]

or

°
- T - (1 - O)L + OR].
n/[,r - Tr
This can be written simply as nC.
Consider now the left-hand side of the n equations. In each case, it is the (partial)
derivative of the probability-of-detection function, expression (5), with respect to one of the
Dis. Taking these derivatives is quite simple because of the nature of the function assumed.
It consists of the sum and difference of many simple terms, each of which can be differentiated separately. We also can note that the derivative ofaX, where a is any number, is a, the
derivative of aX 2 is 2aX, and the (partial) derivative of aYX with respect to X is aY. See,
e.g., A. CHIANG, sttpra note 61, at 161-66, 181-82; W. BAUMOL, supra note 61, at 45-47, 5859. Thus, the (partial) derivative of expression (5) with respect to D 1 is

a - 3D, - 8(D 2 + D3 + .

.+

Dn)

Similarly, the (partial) derivative with respect to any D i is

a - 3D i - 8(D ! + D2

+ . .

.+ Di_ + Di + +

. .

.

+ Dn).

Now since all n of these derivatives must equal the same thing (nC), they all must be equal
to each other, and all of the D i must be equal. Thus, the n equations that define the equilibrium all can be written as
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Multiplying by n produces the aggregate investment for all n potential
plaintiffs given by expression (7):
(no- - n 2C)/[p + (n - 1)81.

(7)

To see how the number of potential plaintiffs affects the total
amount that will be invested in detection and the resulting probability
of detection, we consider the effect of going from two potential plaintiffs to one. Substituting n = 2, and then n = 1, into expression (7)
demonstrates that reducing the number of potential plaintiffs from two,
to one causes total expenditures on detecting collusion to increase, decrease, or stay the same depending on whether 8/P is greater than, less
than, or equal to (a - 3C)/(x - C).97 For example, if we let a = .05, 3
= .008, 8 = .004, and C = .01, then 8/3 and (cx - 3C)/(a - C) both will
equal 1/2. Substituting these values into expression (7), we see that,
with either one potential plaintiff or two potential plaintiffs, the total
amount invested in detection will be 5. With a smaller value for 8, like
8 = .002, and the same values for all other parameters, 8/3 will be less
than (a - 3C)/(a - C). In this situation, two potential plaintiffs would
invest 6, while one potential plaintiff would still invest 5. On the other
hand, with a larger value for 8, like 8 = .007, and the same values for
all other parameters, 8/3 will be greater than (a - 3C)/(a - C). In this
situation, two potential plaintiffs would invest 4, while one potential
plaintiff still would invest 5.
Similarly, by substituting the equilibrium level of investment for
a - 3Di - (n - l)6D i = nC,
or
a - [3 + (n - 1)8]D

i =

nC.

This is easily solved for D i to get expression (6).
97. For n = 2, aggregate investment is
(2a - 4c)/(p3 + 8).
For n = 1, aggregate investment is

(a - C)/P.
Now

(a - C)/P z (2a - 4C)/(p3 + 8)
implies that
ap - C3 + ab8 - cS ; 2apf - 4CP3

or

(o - C)8

(a - 3C)P

or

8/13 i (a - 3C)/(a - C).
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each potential plaintiff, represented by expression (6), back into the
probability-of-detection function, represented by expression (5), it can
be shown that reducing the number of potential plaintiffs from two to
one will cause the probability of detection to increase, decrease, or stay
the same depending on whether 8/3 is greater than, less than, or equal
to (a2 - 7C 2)/ (a 2 - C2).98 If we let a = .05, 3 = .008, 8 = .006, and C
= .01, then the probability of detection with either one potential plaintiff or two potential plaintiffs is .15. With 8 = .004, however, the
probability of detection with two potential plaintiffs is .175, while it is
still .15 with one potential plaintiff. And with 8 = .007, the probability
of detection with two potential plaintiffs is .14, while it remains .15 for
one potential plaintiff.
Thus, for the probability-of-detection function represented by expression (5), both the total amount invested in detecting collusion and
the probability that it will be detected may be greater, less, or the same
with two potential plaintiffs than with one potential plaintiff. Moreover, it is possible that going from two potential plaintiffs to one would
cause the total amount invested in detection to rise while the
probability of detection falls or vice versa. This demonstrates that any
effect of changing the number of potential plaintiffs is possible in theFirst, let n = I in expression (6), so that D, equals (a - C)/3. Substitute this back

98.

into expression (5), producing:
P = a (a - C)/P3 - (f/2) (a

c)2/p

-

2

= (c - C)a/p - (a - C)2 /23
-

2
(2a 2 - 2aC - a 2 + 2axC - C )/2P

= (02 _ C 2)/203.

Second, let n = 2 in expression (6), so that D 1 and D 2 both equal (a - 2C)/(3 + 8). Substitute this into expression (5), producing:
2
P = a 2(a - 2C)/(3 + 8) - (1/2) 2(a - 2C) /(1 + 8)2
2
- 8 (a - 2C) /(1] + 8)2

2
= 2a(a - 2C)/(1 + 8) - (cc - 2C) /(1

= (2a
-

2

- 4aC - a

2

2

2

(a2 - 4C )/(1P + 8).

Now
(a2 -

2

2
P
C )/23

(a2 - 4C )/(p - 8)

implies
a-

2

2

C P + a 8 -

2

2

C 8 Z 2a p3 - 8c21

or
2
2
(a 2 - C )8 : (a

8/p3

-

+ 8)

+ 4aC - 4C )/(3 + 8)

7C2)p

2
(a2 - 7C 2 )/(cL
-

C2 ).
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ory. However, it should also be noted that, if all other parameters are
held constant, increasing the number of potential plaintiffs must cause
the total amount invested in detecting collusion to fall if the number of
firms is sufficiently large. This must be the case because, for all values
of n greater than at/C, nothing will be invested in detecting collusion. 99
Thus, having very large numbers of potential plaintiffs is likely to be
detrimental to detection of collusion in general.
Under certain circumstances, le., when the duplication-of-effort
effect is stronger than the diminishing-returns-to-individual-effort effect, a rule like that of IllinoisBrick could be highly desirable. Indeed,
it could be desirable to have just one potential plaintiff. If we again
consider the realistic choices to be all direct purchasers, all indirect purchasers, some particular class of indirect purchasers, or all direct and
all indirect purchasers, then the first probably would be the best choice
and the last definitely would be the worst choice. Whether probabilityof-detection functions in the real world are such that Illinois Brick
makes sense, however, is not possible to know. It is plausible that detecting collusion is a natural monopoly, at least in many industries, because it is likely that all potential plaintiffs would have access to
basically the same information. Moreover, because generally there will
be fewer direct purchasers than indirect purchasers, under Illinois Brick
there will be a less serious interdependence problem to lessen the incentive for direct purchasers to detect collusion. Furthermore, this interdependence effect may be reinforced by the effects of multiple
potential plaintiffs on litigation and transaction costs. Thus, there is a
case for Illinois Brick in that it certainly is plausible that restricting the
number of potential plaintiffs will cause more to be invested in detecting collusion and increase the likelihood that it will be detected. 100
Conclusion
It was seen that if there were a single direct purchaser and a single
indirect purchaser, one of which would be assigned the exclusive right
99. See supra note 94.
100. Eliminating indirect purchasers as potential plaintiffs in some situations would,
however, significantly weaken deterrence. It was assumed that 8 was positive because there
was some duplication of effort among potential plaintiffs. One can imagine that 8, at least
that between a direct and an indirect purchaser, is negative rather than positive because of
synergistic effects in the detection of collusion by the two types of potential plaintiffs. This
may occur because the detection efforts of potential plaintiffs somehow make others more
efficient detectors. See supra note 90. However, it is difficult to see why that would be the
case. A more realistic possibility arises when different detectors have very different tools
that work best in conjunction. The most likely situation in which that would occur is discussed infra text accompanying note 106.
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to recover damages, there would be little basis for assigning it to the
direct purchaser. The rationale of Illinois Brick, however, has considerable appeal when the implications of multiple direct and indirect
purchasers are considered. There are important reasons why limiting
the number of potential plaintiffs may further the goal of deterrence
and, in particular, why denying recovery rights to indirect purchasers
may be desirable. When the numbers of potential direct and indirect
purchaser plaintiffs likely to exist in "real world" cases are taken into
account, direct purchasers are likely to have a greater incentive to invest in detecting collusion than indirect purchasers. It is likely that
there will be far more indirect purchasers than direct purchasers, so
that, even with a high passing-on rate, individual direct purchasers are
likely to have greater expected returns from detecting collusion and,
thus, a greater incentive to detect collusion. In addition, large numbers
of plaintiffs may increase (if only slightly) total litigation and transaction costs and thereby decrease the incentive to detect collusion. More
importantly, having both direct and indirect purchaser plaintiffs, indeed having indirect purchaser plaintiffs at all in most cases, requires
that the recovery be apportioned among various links in the vertical
supply chain-and the costs of the apportionment are likely to be
substantial.
The critical issue with respect to the numbers of potential plaintiffs, however, is not whether increasing the number of potential plaintiffs will lessen the incentive of each individual plaintiff to invest in
detection, but whether the group of all potential plaintiffs will invest
less in detection and whether the overall probability that collusion will
be detected will fall. With many potential plaintiffs, there is an important interdependence effect; the efforts of each to detect collusion affect
the incentives of all others to do so. The precise nature of this interdependence effect depends, in general, on the specific probability-of-detection function that exists. In particular, it depends on whether and to
what extent each potential plaintiffs ability to increase the probability
that collusion will be detected is affected by the detection efforts of
others. If, as seems reasonably likely, various potential plaintiffs would
examine much the same information in much the same order, then it is
likely that this interdependence would cause increased numbers of potential plaintiffs to lower the aggregate level of investment in detecting
collusion and thereby reduce the probability that collusion will be
detected.
Because direct purchasers generally are fewer in number than indirect purchasers, the severity of this interdependence effect is likely to
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be less when direct purchasers are assigned the exclusive right to recover damages than when indirect purchasers are assigned the exclusive right. Indeed, it is reasonably likely that the indirect purchasers at
any one link of the vertical supply chain will be more numerous than
the direct purchasers, and therefore that the interdependence effect
would be more pronounced ifjust that class of indirect purchasers were
assigned the exclusive right to recovery than if that right were assigned
to direct purchasers. Afortiori, the interdependence effect will be minimized when any single group of purchasers, be it direct purchasers or a
single class of indirect purchasers, is assigned the exclusive right to recover damages instead of dividing that recovery among all of them. In
most cases the effect will be most effectively minimized by assigning the
right to direct purchasers.
Possible Exceptions to Illinois Brick and the Optimal
Legal System
The foregoing recognized the possibility of situations in which Illinois Brick may be inappropriate because assigning the exclusive right
to recover damages to direct purchasers would not further the deterrence goal. Without commenting on the wisdom of existing exceptions1° ' or trying to articulate new ones, it is useful to consider the
proper policy toward exceptions to Illinois Brick in general. The discussion of our model provides two important guides. First, there are
persuasive reasons for not splitting the recovery among plaintiffs at different links of the vertical supply chain, and it would take a most unlikely set of circumstances to overcome them. If there are to be
exceptions, they generally should be cases in which indirect purchasers
at a single link of the vertical supply chain are assigned the exclusive
right to recover damages instead of direct purchasers. Second, any exceptions should be sufficiently clear cut so that there is little doubt
about which class of indirect purchasers may recover damages instead
of direct purchasers. Rules that assign exclusive recovery rights to various classes of potential plaintiffs depending on certain conditions could
have effects at least as detrimental on deterrence as rules that apportion
the recovery among plaintiffs at various links of the vertical supply
chain, unless it is abundantly clear when those conditions exist. The
problem would be particularly acute if litigation were necessary to resolve the question of recovery rights: prior to the resolution of the recovery-rights issue, several classes of potential plaintiffs would have a
101. See supra note 9.
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positive probability of recovering, so the situation would be theoretically equivalent to one in which the recovery would be divided among
02
them.
It is also useful to apply these policy guides to pending legislative
proposals that seek to modify the IllinoisBrick rule. Legislation pending in Congress would allow state attorneys general to seek treble damages on the state's behalf for injuries the state had suffered from price
fixing, as well as on behalf of local governments and ultimate consumers in their states even if they were not direct purchasers. 0 3 The federal government also would be permitted to recover single damages for
injuries that it suffered from price fixing as an indirect purchaser. 0 4 In
addition, the legislation would permit direct purchasers to retain the
right to recover.10 5 Viewed together, these modifications would have
the effect of causing 1) an increase in the litigation and transaction costs
by requiring that damages be apportioned between direct and indirect
purchasers, and 2) a reduction in the incentive of private direct purchasers to detect collusion. Thus, it seems highly likely that deterrence
would be lessened by these modifications. Apportioning damage recovery between governmental and private plaintiffs is particularly deleterious to deterrence because, unlike private parties, potential
governmental plaintiffs cannot be expected to invest more in detection
when they are given a share of the recovery. The amount of governmental investments in detecting collusion may be set according to costbenefit calculations for consumer welfare or on the basis of purely
political considerations, but it almost certainly is not set so as to maximize the governments' revenues. If governments desire to raise revenue by "taxing" price fixers, they should increase the fines they impose.
This would also further deterrence by increasing the penalties that
price fixers would incur if caught.
Although the proposed modifications of the Illinois Brick rule do
102. A risk-neutral potential plaintiff, as assumed in our model, would view these two
situations as exactly the same. However, a risk-averse potential plaintiff would perceive an
important difference. An all-or-nothing allocation rule makes the anticipated recovery
much riskier than a splitting-the-recovery rule in which potential plaintiffs would get something. This increased risk is likely to cause a reduction in the amount invested in detecting
collusion if potential plaintiffs are risk averse.
103. Taxpayer Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1983, S. 915, § 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); Antitrust FairnessAmendments of 1983, H.R. 2244, § 2, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
The House bill would also permit political subdivisions of states to recover damages on their
own behalf as indirect purchasers.
104. The limitation on damages recoverable by the federal government is not new. See
15 U.S.C. § 15a (1982).
105. S. 915, § 2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2244, § 2, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
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not appear desirable from the standpoint of deterrence, they do raise an
important set of issues, not discussed in this Article, dealing with the
optimal legal system. This Article has considered only detection by
private potential plaintiffs and its resulting deterrence implications.
However, price fixing is prohibited by both federal and state law, and
both levels of government help to deter it both by trying to detect it and
by causing price fixers that are caught to pay fines or suffer imprisonment. Thus, the question arises whether deterrence could be furthered
by making antitrust enforcement either exclusively private or exclusively public.
The quadratic example of our model, expression (5), can be used
to determine the likely effect on deterrence of having both private and
public antitrust enforcement by means of the treble-damages action.
The effect on private investment in detecting collusion caused by adding governmental detection efforts is much like that of adding an additional private potential plaintiff. However, it is highly likely that
there are significant synergies between public and private detection efforts and, therefore, that deterrence is furthered by adding governmental detection efforts. The synergy flows from the fact that private
parties have much better access than public parties to information that
can suggest a significant likelihood of collusion, while public parties
have superior tools to ferret out concrete evidence. Private parties deal
with possible price fixers first hand, and at little cost may be able to
identify situations in which there is a significant likelihood of collusion.
Public parties can then use grand juries and civil investigative demands
to determine whether there is, in fact, collusion and to compile the
06
proof that can be used against the defendants.'
106. We believe that the analysis in this Article is sufficient, at least with regard to price
fixing, to overcome arguments that have been made against treble-damages actions in general. These arguments are three-fold: 1) private plaintiffs can profit by not suing immediately, or otherwise mitigating damages, and therefore have an incentive to delay actions that
would cause conspiracies to cease; 2) private plaintiffs may be able to profit by bringing
unmeritorious lawsuits if defendants will pay to settle them rather than litigate; and 3) the
process of damage assessment and payment wastes significant resources. See K. ELZINGA &
W. BREtT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 81-96 (1976). We will consider them in reverse order. The third argument is valid but of dubious importance. The rule of Illinois Brick and
the overcharge method of measuring damages have minimized the costs of treble-damages
actions. These costs are probably a small price to pay for the added deterrence effect
achieved by having private treble-damages actions and thereby providing a powerful incentive for private investment in detecting price fixing. The second argument also is valid, but
it is not an argument against treble-damages actions. Unmeritorious private lawsuits could
be eliminated by amending the antitrust laws to permit treble-damages actions only after a
successful government action for the same violation. The first argument is the most persuasive, but it too may not be an objection inherent to private treble-damages actions. It might
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Conclusion
The Illinois Brick Court's rationale for giving direct purchasers the
exclusive right to recover damages was that doing so would significantly further the goal of deterring antitrust violations.' 0 7 Using an
economic model, we assessed the validity of the Court's rationale by
analyzing how the allocation of the right to recover damages affects
both the incentives of potential plaintiffs to detect collusion and the
probability that collusion will be detected. This analysis led to our conclusion that there clearly is a rational basis for the Illinois Brick rule,
but it is not compelling. Although none of our conclusions are particularly clear cut, assigning exclusive recovery rights to direct purchasers
probably enhances deterrence under likely market conditions. It appears quite likely that, in important respects, the existing legal system
closely resembles the optimal legal system. Major features of the existing system are designed to achieve the greatest possible deterrent effect on price fixing at the least possible cost.' 0 8 Having both public and
private antitrust enforcement appears wise, and something akin to
treble damages for certain violations may be necessary to provide an
adequate incentive for private detection of collusion. Given that private treble-damages actions will be used as a major deterrence weapon,
the Illinois Brick rule of assigning the exclusive recovery right to direct
purchasers probably is appropriate. The rule lowers litigation and
transaction costs, particularly by avoiding the costs of apportionment
of recovery among plaintiffs at different links in the vertical supply
chain, and, therefore, probably enhances deterrence. The Supreme
Court emphasized this effect on apportionment costs in justifying its
decision in Illinois Brick. IllinoisBrick also reduces the disincentive to
invest in detecting collusion likely to arise from the interdependence
among potential plaintiffs. Particularly because of the desirability of
avoiding apportionment costs, exceptions to the rule probably should
be, as they currently are, quite limited. Like many legal rules, llinois
be possible to limit, or even deny, recovery in cases where plaintiffs delayed in acting to
increase the damages. Moreover, it seems somewhat dubious that a conspiracy will go on
for long after it has been detected.
107. See supra note 36 & accompanying text.
108. We have not considered and take no position on such issues as the optimality of the
aggregate investment that is made in detecting collusion, the exact proportions of such investment that are public and private, whether statutory maximum fines and terms of imprisonment are appropriate, or whether damages should be trebled rather than doubled or
quadrupled. Each of these issues is fertile ground for further investigation, as are the modifications to § 4 suggested supra note 106.
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Brick is not perfect but, in context, it probably is the best our legal
system can do.

